Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm

Brent Hueth () and GianCarlo Moschini

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 2, 283-285

Abstract: When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry-deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage.

Keywords: Cooperatives; Endogenous entry; Entry deterrence; Nonconvexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L22 P13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Endogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Firm (2014)
Working Paper: Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:2:p:283-285

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.003

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