Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm

Brent Hueth () and GianCarlo Moschini

ISU General Staff Papers from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: When the threat of entry by followers includes cooperative firms, the maximum fixed cost that a profit maximizing leader can endure is endogenous. The aggressive strategy required for entry-deterrence curtails the leader’s expected profit and can discourage its initial entry. In such circumstances a cooperative firm may yet be viable, despite having a cost handicap and no first-mover advantage

Date: 2014-01-01
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Journal Article: Endogenous market structure and the cooperative firm (2014)
Working Paper: Endogenous Market Structure and the Cooperative Firm (2014)
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