The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

Maciej Kotowski and Fei Li ()

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 420-423

Abstract: We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.

Keywords: War of attrition; Budget constraints; Linkage principle; Auctions; Information disclosure; Contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:420-423

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.034

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