The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information

Maciej Kotowski and Fei Li ()

Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and almost counterbalance their otherwise negative impact.

Date: 2014
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Published in Economics Letters

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Journal Article: The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information (2014)
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