Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially

Tim Friehe and Thomas J. Miceli

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 523-525

Abstract: Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for offenders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the act, even when enforcement is specific.

Keywords: Crime; Deterrence; Marginal deterrence; Optimal sanctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:523-525

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.023

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