Marginal Deterrence When Offenders Act Sequentially

Tim Friehe and Thomas Miceli

No 2014-09, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Marginal deterrence concerns the incentives created by criminal penalties for o enders to refrain from committing more harmful acts. We show that when offenders act sequentially, it is often optimal for the level of the sanction, not just the expected sanction, to rise with the severity of the act, even when enforcement is specific.

JEL-codes: K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Marginal deterrence when offenders act sequentially (2014)
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