A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players

Gaurab Aryal () and Ronald Stauber

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 1, 110-114

Abstract: Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

Keywords: Extensive games; Ambiguity; Maxmin; Dynamic consistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514003085
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players (2014)
Working Paper: A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:110-114

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.018

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().