A Note on Kuhn's Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players

Gaurab Aryal () and Ronald Stauber

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Kuhn's Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrate the limits of Kuhn's Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

Date: 2014-08, Revised 2014-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players (2014)
Working Paper: A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1408.1022

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