Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

Johanna Goertz () and Francois Maniquet

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 1, 25-28

Abstract: Recent research on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has proven that informative voting (that is, voting according to one’s signal) is not necessarily rational. With two alternatives, rational voting typically leads to the election of the correct alternative, in spite of the fact that not all voters vote informatively. We prove that with three alternatives, there are cases in which informative voting is rational and yet leads to the election of a wrong alternative.

Keywords: Condorcet Jury Theorem; Information aggregation; Large Poisson games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:25-28

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.011

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