Condorcet jury theorem: an example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation

Johanna M.M Goertz and Francois Maniquet

No 2613, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2014-01-01
Note: In : Economics Letters, 125(1), 25-28, 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Condorcet Jury Theorem: An example in which informative voting is rational but leads to inefficient information aggregation (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:2613

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().