Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
Miguel Fonseca and
Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 2, 223-225
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.
Keywords: Cartels; Collusion; Communication; Experiments; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:223-225
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