Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence

Miguel Fonseca and Hans-Theo Normann

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 2, 223-225

Abstract: In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that the four-firm industries form cartels more often than the duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.

Keywords: Cartels; Collusion; Communication; Experiments; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:223-225

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.014

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