Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
Miguel Fonseca () and
No 159, DICE Discussion Papers from University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.
Keywords: cartels; collusion; communication; experiments; repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-law
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Journal Article: Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:dicedp:159
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