On the optimality of not allocating

Angel Hernando-Veciana (angel.hernando@uc3m.es) and Fabio Michelucci

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 2, 233-235

Abstract: We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Keywords: Efficiency; Auctions; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: On the Optimality of Not Allocating (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:233-235

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016

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