On the Optimality of Not Allocating

Angel Hernando-Veciana () and Fabio Michelucci

CERGE-EI Working Papers from The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague

Abstract: We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.

Keywords: efficiency; auctions; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the optimality of not allocating (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cer:papers:wp514

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