A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms

Subhasish Chowdhury and Sang-Hyun Kim

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 357-359

Abstract: We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism becomes equivalent to the mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) in which the winners are chosen simultaneously.

Keywords: Contest; Multiple winner; Selection mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:357-359

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.007

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