A Note on Multi-winner Contest Mechanisms

Subhasish Chowdhury and Sang-Hyun Kim

No 58, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the nested elimination mechanism becomes equivalent to another popular mechanism suggested by Berry (1993) where the winners are chosen simultaneously.

Date: 2014-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/afe/UEA-AFE-058.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A note on multi-winner contest mechanisms (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:aepppr:2012_58

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Reception, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
eco.reception@uea.ac.uk

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cara Liggins (eco.reception@uea.ac.uk).