Solidarity within a fixed community

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus, Frank Huettner, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 440-443

Abstract: We study the consequences of a solidarity property that specifies how a value for cooperative games should respond if some player forfeits his productivity, i.e., becomes a null player. Nullified solidarity states that in this case either all players weakly gain together or all players weakly lose together. Combined with efficiency, the null game property, and a weak fairness property, we obtain a new characterization of the equal division value.

Keywords: Equal division value; Nullified solidarity; Weak fairness; Population solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Working Paper: Solidarity within a Fixed Community (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:440-443

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.023

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