Solidarity within a Fixed Community

Sylvain Béal, André Casajus, Frank Huettner, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Abstract: We study the consequences of a solidarity property that specifies how a value for cooperative games should respond if some player forfeits his productivity, i.e., becomes a null player. Nullified solidarity states that in this case either all players weakly gain together or all players weakly lose together. Combined with efficiency, the null game property, and a weak fairness property, we obtain a new characterization of the equal division value.

Keywords: Equal division value; Nullified solidarity; Weak fairness; Population solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Economics Letters, 2014, 125 (3), pp. 440-443. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.023⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01090487

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.023

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