On relationships between substitutes conditions
Mustafa Afacan and
Bertan Turhan ()
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 126, issue C, 10-12
In the matching with contracts literature, three well-known conditions (from stronger to weaker)–substitutes, unilateral substitutes (US), and bilateral substitutes (BS)–have proven to be critical. This paper aims to deepen our understanding of them by separately axiomatizing the gap between BS and the other two. We first introduce a new “doctor separability” condition (DS) and show that BS, DS, and irrelevance of rejected contracts (IRC) are equivalent to US and IRC. Due to Hatfield and Kojima (2010) and Aygün and Sönmez (2012), we know that US, “Pareto separability” (PS), and IRC are the same as substitutes and IRC. This, along with our result, implies that BS, DS, PS, and IRC are equivalent to substitutes and IRC. All of these results are given without IRC whenever hospitals have preferences.
Keywords: Bilateral substitutes; Unilateral substitutes; Substitutes; Doctor separability; Pareto separability; Irrelevance of rejected contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:10-12
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