When pressure sinks performance: Evidence from diving competitions

Christos Genakos, Mario Pagliero and Eleni Garbi

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 132, issue C, 5-8

Abstract: Tournaments are designed to enhance participants’ effort and productivity. However, ranking near the top may increase psychological pressure and reduce performance. We empirically study the impact of interim rank on performance using data from international diving tournaments. We find that competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well.

Keywords: Tournaments; Incentives; Choking under pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 L83 M52 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Working Paper: When Pressure Sinks Performance: Evidence from Diving Competitions (2015)
Working Paper: When pressure sinks performance: evidence from diving competitions (2015)
Working Paper: When pressure sinks performance: Evidence from diving competitions (2014)
Working Paper: When pressure sinks performance: Evidence from diving competitions (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:132:y:2015:i:c:p:5-8

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.04.005

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