When pressure sinks performance: Evidence from diving competitions

Christos Genakos, Mario Pagliero and Eleni Garbi
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Eleni Garbi: Athens University of Economics and Business

No 201414, Working Papers from Athens University Of Economics and Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: Tournaments are designed to enhance participants’ effort and productivity. However, ranking near the top may increase psychological pressure and reduce performance. We empirica- lly study the impact of interim rank on performance using data from international diving tour- naments. We find that competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well.

Keywords: Tournaments; incentives; choking under pressure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J24 L83 M52 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2014
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https://www.dept.aueb.gr/sites/default/files/econ/dokimia/ALLDP142014.pdf Released version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: When pressure sinks performance: Evidence from diving competitions (2015)
Working Paper: When Pressure Sinks Performance: Evidence from Diving Competitions (2015)
Working Paper: When pressure sinks performance: evidence from diving competitions (2015)
Working Paper: When pressure sinks performance: Evidence from diving competitions (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aeb:wpaper:201414:y:2014

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