Evaluating assignment without transfers: A market perspective

YingHua He, Sanxi Li and Jianye Yan

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 133, issue C, 40-44

Abstract: All (random) assignments/allocations without transfers can be considered as market outcomes with personalized prices and an equal income. Prices proportional across agents imply efficiency; common prices lead to efficiency and envy-freeness. This market perspective also reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.

Keywords: Allocation without transfers; Market perspective; Envy-free; Pareto efficient; Coalitional-envy-free (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:133:y:2015:i:c:p:40-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.05.007

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