Evaluating Assignment without Transfers: A Market Perspective

YingHua He, Sanxi Li and Jianye Yan

No 15-559, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We show that every (random) assignment/allocation without transfers can be considered as a market outcome with personalized prices and an equal income. One can thus evaluate an assignment by investigating the prices and the induced opportunity sets. When prices are proportional across agents, the assignment is efficient; when prices are common, the assignment is both efficient and envy-free. Moreover, this market perspective reveals a weakness of envy-freeness.

Keywords: allocation without transfers; competitive equilibrium; equal incomes; market perspective; envy-free; Pareto efficient; coalitional-envy-free; random assignment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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