Economics at your fingertips  

Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments

Miguel Aramendia () and Quan Wen ()

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 136, issue C, 171-174

Abstract: We study subgame perfect equilibria with justifiable punishments in a repeated Cournot model with more than two firms. To implement any of such equilibria, our intuitive strategy design may not be further simplified given the requirement for justifiable punishments.

Keywords: Repeated game; Folk theorem; Justifiable punishments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.030

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2023-06-15
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:171-174