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Details about Miguel Aramendia

E-mail:
Homepage:http://bridgebilbao.es/pag/84/aramendia.html
Workplace:Departamento de Economía Aplicada IV (Matemáticas) (Department of Applied Economics IV (Mathematics)), Facultad de Economía y Empresa (Faculty of Economics and Management), Universidad del País Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (University of the Basque Country), (more information at EDIRC)
Bilbao Research in Decisions, Games and Economics (BRiDGE), Facultad de Economía y Empresa (Faculty of Economics and Management), Universidad del País Vasco - Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea (University of the Basque Country), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Miguel Aramendia.

Last updated 2017-12-11. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: par316


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Journal Articles

2015

  1. Repeated Cournot model with justifiable punishments
    Economics Letters, 2015, 136, (C), 171-174 Downloads View citations (1)

2014

  1. FORWARD-LOOKING PRINCIPLE IN REPEATED GAMES
    International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2014, 16, (04), 1-16 Downloads
  2. Justifiable punishments in repeated games
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 88, (C), 16-28 Downloads View citations (4)

2008

  1. Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model
    Economics Letters, 2008, 99, (2), 246-248 Downloads
  2. Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2008, 8, (1), 17 Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model
    Journal of Economics, 2008, 93, (3), 293-304 Downloads View citations (1)

2006

  1. Asymmetric finite punishments in repeated games
    Economics Letters, 2006, 92, (2), 234-239 Downloads View citations (2)

2005

  1. Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2005, 52, (1), 1-19 Downloads View citations (11)

2004

  1. THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY
    International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2004, 06, (02), 247-264 Downloads
 
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