Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model

Miguel Aramendia ()

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 246-248

Abstract: We define in-and-out strategies which care about group deviations in a noncooperative way in the setting of infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot models with discounting. The subgame perfect equilibrium folk theorem holds when it is restricted to these strategies.

Date: 2008
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