Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model
Miguel Aramendia ()
Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 99, issue 2, 246-248
We define in-and-out strategies which care about group deviations in a noncooperative way in the setting of infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot models with discounting. The subgame perfect equilibrium folk theorem holds when it is restricted to these strategies.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:99:y:2008:i:2:p:246-248
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