Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

Nicolas Carayol, Rémy Delille and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 137, issue C, 50-53

Abstract: We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.

Keywords: Farsighted players; Stability; Equal bargaining power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C70 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2014)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:137:y:2015:i:c:p:50-53

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.020

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