Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation

Nicolas Carayol, Remy Delille and Vincent Vannetelbosch
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Remy Delille: GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We study the stability of networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. The set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the value function is anonymous, component additive and top convex and the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.

Keywords: Equal bargaining power; Farsighted players; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Economics Letters, inPress, 137, pp.50-53. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.020⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2015)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2014)
Working Paper: Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03116629

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.020

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