Locating a public good on a sphere

Swarnendu Chatterjee, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 139, issue C, 46-48

Abstract: It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial.

Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Pareto optimality; Strict strategy-proofness; Coalitional strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Locating a public good on a sphere (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:139:y:2016:i:c:p:46-48

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.015

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