Locating a public good on a sphere

S. Chatterjee, Hans Peters and A.J.A. Storcken
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S. Chatterjee: Quantitative Economics
A.J.A. Storcken: Quantitative Economics

No 28, Research Memorandum from Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE)

Abstract: It is shown that in a model where agents have single-peaked preferences on the sphere, every Pareto optimal social choice function that is strict or coalitional strategy-proof, is dictatorial.

Date: 2015-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ure
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Journal Article: Locating a public good on a sphere (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unm:umagsb:2015028

DOI: 10.26481/umagsb.2015028

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