Full disclosure in decentralized organizations

Jeanne Hagenbach and Frederic Koessler

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 139, issue C, 5-7

Abstract: We consider a class of coordination games with asymmetric information. Agents have different ideal actions and disclose private information strategically. Complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. We provide conditions on information certifiability for the complete information outcome to be implementable under private and public communication.

Keywords: Certifiability; Coordination; Information disclosure; Multi-divisional organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176515005054
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Full disclosure in decentralized organizations (2016)
Working Paper: Full disclosure in decentralized organizations (2016)
Working Paper: Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations (2011)
Working Paper: Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:139:y:2016:i:c:p:5-7

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.002

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().