Full disclosure in decentralized organizations

Jeanne Hagenbach () and Frederic Koessler
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Jeanne Hagenbach: X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - IP Paris - Institut Polytechnique de Paris

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Abstract: We consider a class of coordination games with asymmetric information. Agents have different ideal actions and disclose private information strategically. Complete information is the Pareto dominant information structure. We provide conditions on information certifiability for the complete information outcome to be implementable under private and public communication.

Keywords: Certifiability; Coordination; Information disclosure; Multi-divisional organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Economics Letters, 2016, 139, pp.5-7. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.002⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Full disclosure in decentralized organizations (2016)
Working Paper: Full disclosure in decentralized organizations (2016)
Working Paper: Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations (2011)
Working Paper: Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-01313702

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.12.002

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