Persuasion and receiver’s news

Alessandro Ispano

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 141, issue C, 60-63

Abstract: In a persuasion game with possibly missing evidence a receiver with access to news may make better decisions when she does not observe its content. The value of ignorance deteriorates when communication is two-sided.

Keywords: Disclosure; Informed receiver; Rational ignorance; Two-sided communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516300180
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:141:y:2016:i:c:p:60-63

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.026

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().