Two-sided altruism and signaling

Garance Genicot

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 145, issue C, 92-97

Abstract: When donors and recipients care about each other–two-sided altruism–asymmetry of information about the donor’s income or about the donor’s altruism leads naturally to a signaling game. The desire to signal income or altruism puts upward pressure on transfers.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Remittances; Transfers; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 F24 O15 O16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Two-sided Altruism and Signaling (2015)
Working Paper: Two-sided Altruism and Signaling (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:92-97

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.027

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