Two-sided Altruism and Signaling

Garance Genicot

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: This paper shows that when donors and recipients care about each other two-sided altruism the presence of asymmetry of information about the donor's income leads very naturally to a signaling game. A donor who cares about the recipient's welfare has incentives to appear richer than he is when the recipient cares about him. Similarly, asymmetry of information regarding the donor's income generates a signaling game in the presence of two-sided altruism. These signaling games put upward pressure on transfers and this pressure increases with the altruism of the recipient.

Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Remittances; Transfers; Altruism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
Note: Institutional Papers
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Related works:
Journal Article: Two-sided altruism and signaling (2016)
Working Paper: Two-sided Altruism and Signaling (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:7045

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