FOMC forecasts and monetary policy deliberations

Michael Ellis () and Dandan Liu

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 147, issue C, 131-134

Abstract: This paper investigates the influence of the economic forecasts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members on the committee’s policy deliberations and finds evidence that the policy preferences of only the voting Federal Reserve Bank presidents are influenced by other members’ forecasts.

Keywords: Federal Open Market Committee; Monetary policy committees; Forecasting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E43 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:147:y:2016:i:c:p:131-134

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.08.033

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