Core existence in vertically differentiated markets

Jean J. Gabszewicz, Marco Marini and Ornella Tarola

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 28-32

Abstract: We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms’ products are equispaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.

Keywords: Vertically differentiated markets; Price collusion; Core; Grand coalition; Coalition stability; Games with externalities; Partition function games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D43 L1 L12 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Core Existence in Vertically Differentiated Markets (2016)
Working Paper: Core existence in vertically differentiated markets (2016)
Working Paper: Core Existence in Vertically Differentiated Markets (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:28-32

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.032

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