Core Existence in Vertically Differentiated Markets

Jean Gabszewicz, Marco Marini and Ornella Tarola

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We prove that a sufficient condition for the core existence in a n-firm vertically differentiated market is that the qualities of firms' products are equispaced along the quality spectrum. This result contributes to see that a fully collusive agreement among firms in such markets is more easily reachable when product qualities are not distributed too asymmetrically along the quality ladder.

Keywords: Vertically Differentiated Markets; Price Collusion; Core; Grand Coalition; Coalition Stability; Games with Externalities; Partition Function Games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 D21 D4 L1 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Core existence in vertically differentiated markets (2016)
Working Paper: Core Existence in Vertically Differentiated Markets (2016)
Working Paper: Core existence in vertically differentiated markets (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:80426

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