Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects

Akitoshi Muramoto and Ryuji Sano

Economics Letters, 2016, vol. 149, issue C, 49-51

Abstract: We consider sequential second-price auctions in which heterogeneous objects are sold to bidders with unit demand and a single dimensional type. We show that a symmetric increasing equilibrium exists if objects are ordered in terms of dispersiveness of value distributions. Equilibrium price declines when objects are equivalent on average and additional conditions hold.

Keywords: Sequential auctions; Declining price anomaly; Dispersiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Sequential Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:149:y:2016:i:c:p:49-51

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.006

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