Sequential Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects

Akitoshi Muramoto (muramotoakitoshi@fdn-ip.or.jp) and Ryuji Sano
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Akitoshi Muramoto: Institute of Intellectual Property, Foundation for Intellectual Property

No 945, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: We consider sequential second-price auctions in which heterogeneous objects are sold to bidders with unit demand and a single dimensional type. We show that a symmetric increasing equilibrium exists if objects are ordered in terms of dispersiveness of value distributions. Equilibrium price declines when objects are equivalent on average and additional conditions hold.

Keywords: sequential auctions; declining price anomaly; dispersiveness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9pages
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-gth and nep-mic
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http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP945.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Sequential auctions of heterogeneous objects (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:945

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