Voluntary public good provision with private information using order statistics
Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 150, issue C, 63-66
We study the voluntary provision of a public good with private information when inputs are not perfectly substitutable. Modeling the production function as a mixture of order statistics of individual efforts, we bridge the extreme best-shot and weakest-link technologies, passing through summation, in a tractable framework. In contrast with existing predictions, increasing complementarity results in increased public good provision, if the marginal cost of effort rises sufficiently fast.
Keywords: Weaker-link; Better-shot; Privately-provided public good; Complementarity; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:63-66
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