Details about Stefano Barbieri
Access statistics for papers by Stefano Barbieri.
Last updated 2012-09-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
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- Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice
Working Papers, Tulane University, Department of Economics View citations (3)
- Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Linear Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game
Working Papers, Tulane University, Department of Economics
- Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game
Working Papers, Tulane University, Department of Economics View citations (2)
See also Journal Article in Journal of Public Economics (2010)
- Membership in Citizen Groups
Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2009)
- Communication and Early Contributions
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2012, 14, (3), 391-421 View citations (6)
- Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2010, 10, (1), 1-31 View citations (12)
- Threshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game
Journal of Public Economics, 2010, 94, (11-12), 848-861 View citations (7)
See also Working Paper (2009)
- Membership in citizen groups
Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 67, (1), 217-232
See also Working Paper (2004)
- Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous‐Strategy Equilibria in the Private‐Information Subscription Game
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10, (4), 529-545 View citations (11)
- Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
Economic Theory, 2008, 37, (1), 51-80 View citations (13)
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