Overzealous Rule Makers

Stefano Barbieri () and Kai Konrad

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with overlapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take policy action and preempt others, even if their cost of action is very high. This can lead to actionism, excessive regulatory activity, and radical rule outcomes.

Keywords: rule-making competition; preemption; identity dependent externalities; extremism; regulatory thicket (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2020-09
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http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2020-11.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Overzealous Rule Makers (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2020-11

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