Overzealous Rule Makers
Stefano Barbieri and
Kai A. Konrad
Journal of Law and Economics, 2021, vol. 64, issue 2, 341 - 365
Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with overlapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take policy action and preempt others, even if their cost of action is very high. This can lead to actionism, excessive regulatory activity, and radical rule outcomes.
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