Overzealous Rule Makers

Stefano Barbieri and Kai Konrad

Journal of Law and Economics, 2021, vol. 64, issue 2, 341 - 365

Abstract: Excessively tight and biased policy choices of rule makers can be explained as outcomes of competition among rule makers with overlapping competencies and diverging perceptions about the optimal framework. Rule makers who have extreme rather than moderate preferences are more likely to take policy action and preempt others, even if their cost of action is very high. This can lead to actionism, excessive regulatory activity, and radical rule outcomes.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/711354 (application/pdf)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/711354 (text/html)
Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

Related works:
Working Paper: Overzealous Rule Makers (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/711354

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Law and Economics from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division ().