Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect

Stefano Barbieri () and Marco Serena

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: In sequential primaries, fair representation of the electorate may be undermined by the New Hampshire effect. Simultaneous primaries address fair representation, but may increase expenditures. We analyze these issues by studying heterogeneity in sequential and simultaneous contests. If a player is stronger in every battle (e.g., a candidate is favorite by the entire electorate), then expenditures are smaller in sequential than in simultaneous contests, as in the literature for homogeneous players, and the stronger player is more likely to win in sequential than simultaneous contests. However, if playersÂ’ advantages alternate across battles, then expenditures may be greater in sequential than in simultaneous contests, and the player who has the advantage later in sequential contest is more likely to win: dynamics affect representation. We interpret our results in light of the candidatesÂ’advantages due to statesÂ’ demographics in the 2020 US primaries and discuss novel testable implications of our analysis.

Keywords: contests; momentum effect; temporal structures. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69 pages
Date: 2020-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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