Details about Marco Serena
Access statistics for papers by Marco Serena.
Last updated 2026-02-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pse563
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Working Papers
2023
- Disclosure Policies in All-pay Auctions with Affiliation
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- On the (Im-)Possibility of Representing Probability Distributions as a Difference of I.I.D. Noise Terms
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance 
Also in ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich (2023) 
See also Journal Article On the (Im-)Possibility of Representing Probability Distributions as a Difference of I.I.D. Noise Terms, Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS (2025) (2025)
2021
- An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- Reputation for Toughness
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
2020
- Bid Caps and Disclosure Policies
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance 
See also Journal Article Fair representation in primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire effect, Journal of Theoretical Politics (2025) (2025)
- Winner's Effort Maximization in Large Contests
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance 
See also Journal Article Winner’s effort maximization in large contests, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier (2021) View citations (4) (2021)
2019
- Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size and Asymmetric Beneï¬ ts
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
2018
- Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance View citations (4)
- Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance View citations (5)
See also Journal Article Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size, Public Choice, Springer (2018) View citations (5) (2018)
- Successful Opaque Management
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
2017
- A Belief-based Theory for Private Information Games
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- Harnessing Beliefs to Stimulate Efforts; on the Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance View citations (2)
2016
- Level-k Models Rationalize Overspending in Contests
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
- Properties of Contests
Working Papers, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Journal Articles
2025
- Fair representation in primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire effect
Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2025, 37, (4), 290-318 
See also Working Paper Fair Representation in Primaries: Heterogeneity and the New Hampshire Effect, Working Papers (2020) (2020)
- On the (Im-)Possibility of Representing Probability Distributions as a Difference of I.I.D. Noise Terms
Mathematics of Operations Research, 2025, 50, (1), 390-409 
See also Working Paper On the (Im-)Possibility of Representing Probability Distributions as a Difference of I.I.D. Noise Terms, Working Papers (2023) (2023)
- R&D contest design with resource allocation and entry fees
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, 238, (C)
- Repeated contests with commitment types
European Economic Review, 2025, 177, (C)
- Type-projection, pro-social behavior, and a public good game
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2025, 237, (C)
2024
- Centralized assignment of prizes and contestants
Social Choice and Welfare, 2024, 62, (1), 117-152
- Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with affiliated values
Economic Modelling, 2024, 141, (C)
- Winner's effort in multi-battle team contests
Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, 145, (C), 526-556
2023
- Disclosure Policies in All-Pay Auctions with Bid Caps
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2023, 209, (C), 141-160 View citations (2)
2022
- An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2022, 90, (C) View citations (4)
- Biasing dynamic contests between ex-ante symmetric players
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 136, (C), 1-30 View citations (6)
- Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants’ types
Economic Theory, 2022, 74, (3), 763-792 View citations (13)
- Level- k Models and Overspending in Contests
Games, 2022, 13, (3), 1-12 View citations (1)
2021
- Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits
European Journal of Political Economy, 2021, 67, (C)
- The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management
International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, 50, (2), 377-397
- Winner’s effort maximization in large contests
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2021, 96, (C) View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Winner's Effort Maximization in Large Contests, Working Papers (2020) (2020)
2019
- A Game-Free Microfoundation of Mutual Optimism
Games, 2019, 10, (4), 1-14 View citations (1)
2018
- Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
Public Choice, 2018, 177, (1), 53-66 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size, Working Papers (2018) View citations (5) (2018)
2017
- Quality contests
European Journal of Political Economy, 2017, 46, (C), 15-25 View citations (17)
- Sequential contests revisited
Public Choice, 2017, 173, (1), 131-144 View citations (10)
Chapters
2018
- Contest theory
Chapter 6 in Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, 2018, pp 125-146 View citations (13)
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