Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size

Christos Mavridis () and Marco Serena
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Christos Mavridis: Lancaster University

Public Choice, 2018, vol. 177, issue 1, No 3, 53-66

Abstract: Abstract We study the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes (majority and minority), as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (Public Choice 41(1):7–53, 1983). We find a unique equilibrium wherein the minority votes with certainty and the majority votes with probability in (0, 1); we prove that this is the only equilibrium in which voters of only one group play a pure strategy, and we provide sufficient conditions for its existence. Equilibria where voters of both groups vote with probability in (0, 1) are analyzed numerically.

Keywords: Costly voting; Pivotal voter model; Complete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Complete Information Pivotal-Voter Model with Asymmetric Group Size (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:177:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-018-0585-6

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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6

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