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Sequential contests revisited

Marco Serena ()

Public Choice, 2017, vol. 173, issue 1, 131-144

Abstract: Abstract In a past issue of this journal, Morgan (Public Choice 116:1–18, 2003) finds that aggregate effort is greater in sequential than in simultaneous lottery contests. We show that Morgan’s result is incorrect owing to a slip in a proof, and that aggregate effort turns out to be greater in sequential contests only if the contestants are sufficiently homogeneous. Additionally, we discuss the robustness of the corrected result to different specifications of the contest success function, and we partially restore Morgan’s case for sequential contests by showing that these contests are more desirable when maximizing only the effort of the winner, rather than maximizing the aggregate effort.

Keywords: Contest design; Sequential contests; Simultaneous contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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