Repeated contests with commitment types

Stefano Barbieri and Marco Serena

European Economic Review, 2025, vol. 177, issue C

Abstract: Contestants fight in repeated contests and privately know whether they are rational utility maximizers or automatons committed to always fighting “all-in.” In the unique symmetric equilibrium, rational contestants fight all-in in early contests as doing so buys a beneficial “all-in look” that intimidates rivals in future contests. In equilibrium, several structural differences emerge between periods in which multiple contestants maintain an all-in look, as opposed to one: most prominently, only in the former case aggregate efforts may exceed the per-period prize, and only in the latter payoffs can be positive.

Keywords: Repeated all-pay auction; Contests; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:177:y:2025:i:c:s0014292125001059

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.105055

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