Membership in Citizen Groups

Stefano Barbieri () and Andrea Mattozzi

No 1206, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods.

Keywords: public goods; associations; dynamic global games; heterogeneous commuities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Membership in citizen groups (2009)
Working Paper: Membership in Citizen Groups (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1206

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